Fund managers' bias toward geographically proximate securities is a well-researched phenomenon, yet the origins of managers' location choices have received little empirical scrutiny. This paper traces the employment and geographic heritage of 358 entrepreneurial fund managers and analyzes the determinants of where they locate their firms and stock selections. The evidence suggests that start-ups tend to be based close to the origins of their founders and in regions with more investment management firms, banking establishments, and large institutional money managers. New money managers show a strong local bias in their equity holdings, three times the levels previously documented for mutual funds. The propensity to invest closer to home correlates strongly with the presence of sub-advisory opportunities from institutional investors in the vicinity. While home bias levels between managers who relocate with their start-ups and the rest of the entrepreneurs are similar, preferences for stocks that were formally local persist.
I. Introduction
A growing literature documents strong links between investors' decisions and geographic location beginning with French and Poterba (1991) . The phenomenon is reported for individual investors (Lewis (1995) , (1999) , Huberman (2001) , and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ) and important intermediaries such as mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz (1999) , (2001), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) , and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) ). The role of geography in economic activities has continued unabated despite phenomenal strides in information technology and the attendant reduction in transportation and communication costs (see Moskowitz (1999), p. 2047) . Given the apparent economic benefits to investors biasing their portfolios toward their home base (e.g., Hau (2001) ), it is surprising that very little is understood about how intermediaries choose where to locate in the first instance. Moreover, virtually no research has targeted relations between the characteristics of investment companies' location choices and the geographic spread of their portfolio holdings. In this paper, I attempt to fill this gap by examining the location decisions of fund managers who start their own investment management firms. I also examine how fund managers' stock holdings relate to their former and newly chosen locations. Specifically, I address two main research questions: i) which location characteristics attract investment management start-ups?; and ii) do entrepreneurs tilt their portfolio holdings toward stocks that are close to where they locate?
Coverage of fund manager entrepreneurship in the popular press implies that certain locations encourage start-up activity more than others. New investment advisory firm formation in Boston, for example, is often credited to the influence of mutual fund giants located in the city such as Fidelity Investments and Vanguard.' I examine the selection of locations by money management start-ups as a discrete choice problem where founders' hypothesized geographic preferences are motivated from the well-established industrial location theoretical literature (e.g., Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser (2002) and Figueiredo, Guimaraes, and Woodward (2002) ). I define entrepreneurial fund managers' home bases as their last places of employment and examine whether the location of start-ups relates to the characteristics of the places hosting their former employers. I then apply the Coval and Moskowitz (2001) measure of local bias in mutual fund portfolio holdings to the stocks held by start-ups in their first year of investment operations to perform tests of local bias in portfolios of start-ups.
To answer the questions raised in this paper, I use a unique hand-collected data set of over 350 seasoned fund managers who start their own firms. I find that start-ups tend to locate close to the origins of their founders and in regions with more investment management firms, banking establishments, and large institutional money managers. New money managers show a strong local bias in their equity holdings, three times the levels previously documented for mutual funds. The presence of sub-advisory opportunities from institutional investors in the vicinity is associated with the preference to base closer to home. Local bias levels between managers who relocate with their start-ups and the rest of the entrepreneurs are similar. However, preferences for stocks that were proximate while the entrepreneurs were in paid employment persist.
Apart from contributing to the existing research on home bias in investors' location and portfolio decisions, this paper relates closely to at least three other strands of the literature. First, the study partially answers Frame and White's (2004) call for researchers to examine financial innovations, including new organizations. Second, the proliferation of investment management vehicles has been the subject of considerable interest among financial economists (e.g., Khorana (1996) and Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005) ). By examining the spatial distribution of new investment firms, this paper extends our understanding of the expansion of the investment management industry. Third, the career track records of professional fund managers have increasingly caught the attention of academics (Chevalier and Ellison (1999) ). Given that the existing managerial turnover liter-'See, for an example, "Chicago blues: It's a great, livable city, but it's fading as a business and financial capital. What can be done?" BusinessWeek, 16 October 2000. ature generally ignores entrepreneurial investment managers, this paper, with its focus on self-employment as a form of managerial promotion, helps address the question: where do experienced fund managers go?
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section II describes the hypotheses that will be tested. The compilation of the data set is summarized in Section III. Section IV examines the determinants of start-ups' location choices. Section V analyzes the geographic allocation of equity investments by start-ups and assesses the relation between local portfolio bias and several location characteristics. Key patterns of the stock selections of a subset of managers who relocate with their start-ups are also presented. Section VI summarizes the findings and suggests directions for further research in this area.
II. Development of Hypotheses
In this section, I develop two main sets of hypotheses that support the analysis presented in this study. The first set concerns the characteristics of locations that are chosen by entrepreneurial fund managers. The second set of hypotheses is founded on the null that location factors are not related to a fund manager's preference for locally-based stocks. I discuss each set of hypotheses in turn.
A. Determinants of Start-Ups' Location Choices
It is commonplace in studies of firm location to hypothesize that start-ups in the investment management industry seek advantages that accrue from collocating with other firms. One source of such advantages might be the spillover of knowledge between incumbent firms, including buyer and supplier industries (Porter (1990) ), and the start-up. On the supply of expertise, Zingales (2000) argues that human capital is critical to the development of new firms. I hypothesize that the availability of establishments in the same industry as well as related activities contribute to start-ups' location decisions. The presence of related industries reflects the potential for start-ups to tap skills outside their own industry.^ On the demand for investment advisory services, Fischer and Harrington (1996) suggest a theory in which service-oriented firms benefit from heightened demand when they collocate with establishments in the same industry because clients are drawn to such areas. Thus, related industries could also capture the market potential of the area as conduits for funds under management from wealthy private and public firms, agencies, and households. Another potential source of positive returns for money management start-ups is the presence in a location of repositories of assets to be managed. Large investment management firms are regarded in the financial press as a magnet for new firms. Moreover, to the extent that large institutional investors reflect the maturity and innovativeness of the incumbent industry, I expect their presence in a Component Economic Area (CEA) to provide a favorable base for networking and attracting resources that foster start-ups.-'
For an example of the exodus of expertise from the banking sector to the investment management industry see "Flight of SunTrust Money Management Execs Shows It's Tough for Banks to Keep Top Talent," American Banker, 160 (71), p. 1, 13 April 1995. 'For example, in comparing the contributions of large investment companies based in Boston and Chicago to the development of money management in the cities, BusinessWeek writes: "Local An alternative perspective to the location factors predicted above is that entrepreneurial fund managers could actually resist clustering. One reason could be the quest to differentiate a start-up by locating away from the competition. Seeking new markets could drive start-ups to base in areas with low concentrations of competitors.
In the theoretical literature, high labor costs are generally regarded as discouraging location. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Bartik (1985) finds such costs deter investment, while Carlton (1983) reports the opposite. In the case of new investment management firms, experts admit that "people are the hands-down largest expense.'"* One prediction is that high employment costs are regarded as necessary for attracting and retaining expertise. Therefore, these costs will not deter entrepreneurs. Another possibility is that entrepreneurs know the best investment professionals are concentrated in some areas. Since their marginal product is higher, wages are higher in these areas and serve as a proxy for high quality potential employees, thus attracting start-ups.
Urbanization is also regarded as a strong allure to start-ups in the literature, I expect the extent of a region's urban infiuence to affect location decisions. For instance, financial centers may induce fund managers to be overconfident in their investment decisions (Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2004) ). Overconfidence about a firm's prospects could affect managers' location decisions (Almazan, de Motta, and Titman (2003) ), Extending this logic to investment management start-ups raises the possibility that this phenomenon and other unobservable factors unique to financial centers could infiuence start-ups' location choices. Managers may also be guided by property cost information in finding a location, resulting in fewer start-ups being based in financial centers.
The assumption implied in these predictions is that the location factors also motivate fund managers' decisions about whether to stay in the area where they held their last job or move away. Alternatively, fund managers may opt not to relocate when they start their own firms for personal social and economic reasons. Such infiuences could be thought of as characterizing the constrained nature of a manager's location choice.^ For example, a major consideration in whether to change locations is likely to be the localized nature of a portfolio manager's reputation. Personal familiarity appears to be an important determinant of relations between fund managers and their clients. From anecdotal evidence, while performance records are useful, fund managers enjoy a significant measure of trust from their local peers and clients based on past relations. These networks may become important considerations in location decisions.* Other considerations include perfund managers blame the disappointing comparisons on lost opportunities. At Stein Roe, the owners early on balked at hefty investments in marketing and infrastructure, argues Marshall B, Front, its ex-president, 'Stein Roe wasn't much different in size from Fidelity and Vanguard (in the 1970s),' he says, 'Those organizations were more forward thinking. They saw the potential of mutual funds,'" BusinessWeek, 16 October 2000,
•'See "Spinning Off a Firm on Their Own," Investment Management Weekly, 11 May 1998, 'i thank the referee for suggesting this interpretation, *For example in the article, "Loyalty to Detroit Area Pays Off for Investment Entrepreneur," American Banker, 152 (166), p, 6, 25 August 1987, Lee Munder is reported as saying: "Professionally, Detroit has been a wonderful community to me. Clients here tend to be very loyal. There is a mutual respect among competitors, and a bond exists within the financial community that is indigenous only to the Midwest," sonal ties to family and friends, schooling arrangements for children, and the cost of relocating.
To take these issues into account, I hypothesize, first, that social and lifestylerelated factors will affect the decision of where a new fund firm is located. Second, I expect that there will remain influences that cannot be disentangled from the general advantages of a manager's familiarity with a certain location. For example, there could be costs involved in relocating that are large enough to bias the location decision toward the home base. Such costs may not be fully reflected in variables relating to individual managers' lifestyles and social preferences. Third, factors that attract fund managers could present stronger influences on managers who move from their home region (movers) than those who remain in their home base (non-movers) (Figueiredo et al. (2002) ). These considerations suggest the need to control specifically for the home base when considering determinants of location choice.
B. The Extent and Determinants of Local Bias in Start-Ups' Portfolios
The first question of interest with regard to the geographic coverage of the stocks held by fund start-ups is whether local bias in entrepreneurial fund managers' portfolios differs from levels documented for mutual funds in studies such as Coval and Moskowitz (1999) , (2001), Hong et al. (2005) , and Ivkovid and Weisbenner (2005) . If entrepreneurs remain within their regions of origin so as to continue to exploit local networks, one might expect them to exhibit at least as much home bias in their stock preferences as their previous employers. Similar effects could emerge if the new firms replicate the (home-biased) strategies of the former employers of their founders. Finding higher levels of home bias for the start-ups could signal that new firms, facing restricted access to resources, generally avoid research-intensive distant stocks. In such a case, they would rely more heavily on local information as a low cost strategy for competing with established institutions. This argument conforms to the "informational asymmetry" hypothesis predicting that local investors tilt their portfolios to nearby stocks because they have superior information on such securities (see Coval and Moskowitz (2001) ).
An alternative argument can be mounted against the local bias hypothesis. Investment company start-ups are predominantly institutional account managers. Thus, their local bias could be lower than the levels documented for mutual funds since institutional clients are less prone to biases in their portfolio decisions than individual investors (in mutual funds) (Shapira and Venezia (2001) ).
The geographic spread of a start-up's operations, proxied for by stock holdings, may contain information on location choices. Next, I turn to the question of whether factors affecting location decisions manifest themselves in start-ups' portfolio decisions as well. I start with the null hypothesis that they do not. However, Goetzmann, Massa, and Simonov (2004) suggest that the knowledge spillovers accompanying the clustering of firms induce investors to choose familiar assets. In managing their portfolios, entrepreneurial fund managers primarily require research expertise and capital. Therefore, the supply of related establishments and institutional investors may become important influences on the decision to bias portfolios close to or further away from the home base of the start-up.
I also expect that the social and economic prospects of an area will be important indicators of the profit potential of companies located in close proximity to a start-up and will be positively related to the extent of local bias in their portfolios.
If employment costs are an indicator of the quality of expertise available in an area, they could predict the extent of home bias in managers located there. For example, finding a negative relation between labor costs and local bias in an area's fund managers would imply that better remunerated managers are less prone to relying on home bias in their portfolio strategies.
Fund managers located in financial centers are more likely to select more stocks in their immediate vicinity than those located in smaller cities (Coval and Moskowitz (2001) ). Moreover, Goetzmann et al. (2004) show that urban investors are more locally biased than rural-based investors. Following these cirguments, I also hypothesize that location factors defining the extent of urbanization in an area will be pertinent to the geographic spread of start-ups' portfolios.
In the context of start-ups in the investment management industry, it seems plausible that if local bias relates to area characteristics the link should be more salient for managers who retain their home base than for movers. To the extent that local bias is a result of the exploitation of local networks and resources, the distinction between movers and non-movers cannot be ignored. My hypotheses concerning the influence of location characteristics on local bias therefore lead to a requirement for the home base of the entrepreneur to be controlled for.
Finally, that some entrepreneurial fund managers relocate to distant areas upon forming their own firms while others stay in their home base raises two questions regarding the geographic spread of start-ups' portfolios. First, do movers relocate to areas with high or low competition in terms of the number of fund managers relative to the stocks located in such areas? Fischer and Harrington's (1996) argument that consumer demand and collocation with related industry firms are linked seems sufficient to yield the hypothesis that movers in this study will base in areas with high concentrations of fund managers relative to stocks. An alternative to this hypothesis is that movers choose areas where there are relatively many stocks and few fund managers (e.g., Bellevue, WA and Menlo Park, CA).Ŝ econd, do movers show a tendency to hold on to stocks that were proximate to their former home bases? Answering this question is a direct test of whether local network effects persist after a manager relocates to start a new firm and constitutes a further robustness check on the role of geography in the genesis of home bias. I expect that at least earlier in their firm's life cycle, fund managers will be affected by a "look back" bias toward stocks they were previously familiar with. Furthermore, as suggested by the home bias literature, such stocks would be located close to their former home bases. In the meantime, if there are indeed advantages to biasing stock selections locally, it is reasonable to expect a bias in favor of the new locations to start developing as well.
'i thank the referee for suggesting these examples.
III. Constructing the Data Set A. Start-Up and Parent Information
Critically, the study requires tracing the locations of fund managers' last employers and of their own firms. The data collection exercise is complicated by the fact that commonly used mutual fund databases such as Morningstar and CRSP do not contain information on reasons for or dates of manager turnover at established fund companies as well as their background career histories. Hence, these databases cannot be utilized to identify a sample for this study. I use a unique hand-collected data set culled from a combination of public domain sources and electronic databases. To generate the initial list of fund managers that leave established investment companies specifically to set up their own money management firms, I search the Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and ABI-Inform databases for relevant news articles. I supplement these sources with searches of ADV Forms lodged by fund advisors when they register for licensing through the SEC's Investment Advisor Public Disclosure system. I also identify start-ups and their founders in fund manager directories and Web sites of mutual fund companies. The resulting data set is a rich history of new mutual fund companies at their inception detailing the fund managers, parent fund families, departure dates, and identities of start-ups. I also collect information on the locations of parent and start-up firms.
Several advantages can be ascribed to the data set construction process. First, I sample start-up companies at birth, hence limiting potential survivorship bias. Linked to this advantage, observing start-ups at birth largely resolves concerns about subsequent name changes as both parents and new firms are identified with the names that exist then. Second, the data set covers periods of varying levels of popularity of fund types and styles, meaning that my results will likely not be solely driven by transient trends.
One natural concern about using news articles as the primary source of information on entrepreneurial activities is that the sample is biased toward successful fund managers likely to receive media coverage. This concern is resolved, at least in part, by the fact that my search covers both high profile national news outlets such as The Wall Street Journal, presumably prone to following high fiying portfolio managers, and smaller regional publications that are likely to report on fund managers of smaller stature.
For purposes of this paper, I define entrepreneurs as the founders and initial executive officers in firms formed by investment professionals leaving established fund families. The original sample of fund managers comprises over 450 fund managers spanning the period 1980 to 2003. However, matching this data set with location characteristics as described below reduces the number to 358 executives at 207 firms founded from 1988 to 2003.
B. Locality Information
Tests on the determinants of location choice at the firm level are based on the CEA as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Throughout the rest of the paper, I use the terms CEAs, areas, and regions interchangeably. The 348 CEAs covering the U.S. land mass are collections of counties centered. in most cases, on metropolitan statistical areas (see Syverson (2004) for a detailed explanation). While a drawback of using this unit of analysis may be that it imposes arbitrary boundaries on the location characteristics considered by entrepreneurs, the BEA selects counties for inclusion in a given CEA on the basis of their metropolitan statistical area status, worker commuting patterns, and newspaper circulation patterns, subject to the condition that CEAs must contain only contiguous counties. Thus, the selection process ensures that counties in a given CEA are economically related (Johnson (1995) ). Therefore, I argue that the CEA is a suitable compromise to using state boundaries that could be considered too broad or county borders that could be too localized. More importantly, using CEAs gives a geographic unit with boundaries that are consistent throughout this paper's sample period.Î link all CEAs to the BEA's County Business Patterns Database based on the Business Information Tracking System (BITS) database. Introduced to the finance literature by Villalonga (2004) , BITS is a longitudinal database that tracks individual firms and their employment growth over time and constitutes the economic micro data aggregated at the county level in the County Business Patterns Database. Therefore, for each CEA I am able to track mid-March employment, payroll, employee numbers, and establishment count data for the period 1988 to 2002, the last year in the database. Although the basic unit of the BITS data is a business establishment (location or plant), at the County Business Patterns database level, the aggregation process scrambles individual firm identities. In the event of sparse data at the county level, making it possible to link the data to individual establishments, the BEA camouflages firm identities by replacing numbers with alphabetic flags representing employment size class (at ranges of 1-4, 5-9, and so forth) for data withheld to avoid disclosure. In such cases, the number of employees and payroll data are replaced by zeroes. To estimate employment size for these firms, I follow Syverson (2004) and take the midpoint of the size class given in the database. In the case of withheld payroll data, I turn to the comprehensive data on number of establishments and compute the average number of employees per establishment. I am then able to obtain an estimate of the annual payroll per employee by dividing the average payroll amount by the number of employees per establishment.Î collect county level information from the County Business Patterns database and aggregate the data at the CEA level by industry as follows: investment management (SIC/NAICS codes 6700 (before 1998) and 524 (from 1998 onward)), securities (6200, 523), banking (6000/6100, 522), and insurance (6300, 524).'° I *1 utilize the 1995 BEA economic area boundaries (see Johnson (1995) for details). For the pre-1995 period, I simply treat the current boundaries as applying them to avoid problems of data discontinuity due to shifting CEA boundaries.
'Although it might be preferable to base payroll estimates on full-time equivalent employees, the BEA lumps full-and part-time workers together. The result is that the average employment costs for industries and CEAs with high numbers of part-time people may be lower than those with a higher percentage of full-time employees. However, for purposes of this study the important issue is to differentiate regions on the basis of employment costs and not on determining the absolute levels of such expenses.
'"Beginning in 1998, the data are tabulated by industry as defined in the North American Industry Classification System: United States, 1997 (NAICS). Data for 1997 and earlier years are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) System. 1 use SIC to refer to both classification systems also obtain data on the dominant investment management firms in the U.S, from the Institutional Investor America's Top 300 Money Managers Surveys of 1988 Surveys of , 1992 Surveys of , 1996 Surveys of , and 2001 assign assets reported in millions of dollars to relevant CEAs according to the location of the institutions as disclosed in the surveys.
For further social and economic CEA characteristics, I use the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) County Typology Codes," In the data, reflecting area characteristics, Metro (or Non-Metro), Housing Stress, Low Education, Low Employment, Persistent Poverty, Low Employment, Recreation, and Retirement dominant counties are marked by 1,0 dummy variables. The Urban Influence code ranges from 1 (highest) to 12 (lowest). I aggregate the county typology data for each region by taking an average of each indicator for all counties constituting the CEA.
I describe the spatial distribution of start-ups in Table 1 . Panel A shows that the top 10 localities of choice (hosting four or more new firms) are dominated by financial centers with New York, Boston, San Francisco, and Chicago occupying the first four positions. Further, as reported in Panel B, start-up numbers coalesce in 26 states led by California (36), New York (32), Massachusetts (27), and Pennsylvania (16). Table 2 compares CEAs that are chosen as bases by new firms to those that are never selected. I take the average for each CEA that ever hosted a new firm during the sample period: i.e., those that were chosen as locations by at least one start-up. I contrast these CEAs to those that never host a start-up over the time period. The tabulation shows that 140 out of 348 CEAs are chosen as locations by entrepreneurial fund managers and selected regions tend to be considerably larger than non-hosts. For instance, the median non-hosting CEA is about 5% the size of the median hosting CEA in terms of investment industry employment numbers and 10% on the basis of establishment counts. Similarly, CEAs that are chosen by entrepreneurs are home to significantly larger banking and insurance undertakings. However, investment industry employment costs in the locations that entrepreneurs choose are on average nineteen-fold those of non-host CEAs. The median start-up-hosting CEA is also the location of institutions controlling over $20 billion in assets among the top 300 investors in the country, compared to a median of zero for non-host CEAs.
I report the spatial distribution of entrepreneurs relative to their origins in Panel A of Table 3 . The strong preference for investment firm founders to locate in close proximity to their origins is very clear. Entrepreneurs that stay within the CEA where their last employer is located comprise 80% of the sample. Even when I consider locations at the county level, 68% of the entrepreneurs choose the county hosting their last place of employment. To give another perspective of the geographic distribution of entrepreneurial fund managers relative to their origins, I use distance in kilometers as an alternative measure. To each location, usually identified in source documents by city and then state, I assign latitude and longitude coordinates obtained from the Geographic Names Information System for simplicity. My reference to the word industry is also restricted to the financial services sectors of banking, investments, securities, and insurance, '' See http://www,ers,usda,gov/Data/TypologyCodes/, 
(GNIS).'^ I calculate distance between two places using their respective coordinates in spherical geometry as follows: where latitude and longitude are measured in radians.''' The constant, 6370.997, is the earth's radius in kilometers and converts the distance into units of one kilometer. Panel B of Table 3 gives the cumulative distribution of distances between firm founders and their origins. Of note is the large proportion, 56%, of entrepreneurs locating within a kilometer of their last employers. Seventy-five percent locate within 25 kilometers of their origins. These figures closely corroborate the impression of "home-bias" in location decisions given by the CEA-based analysis.
C. Portfolio Holdings
It is common for fund managers that establish their own firms to start as institutional account managers. Money management firms that accumulate significant assets (exceeding $100 million) have to submit 13f Holdings returns to the SEC. I use the SDA/Spectmm database provided by Thomson Financial to access the portfolio holdings of 152 start-up investment management firms from my original sample in the period 1984 to 2003. Of these companies, 141 are in the 1988-2003 sample used up to this stage. I concentrate on holdings at the end of the first year of a fund company's appearance in the database. In this way, I achieve a specific cut-off point that is not reliant on the varying dates at which the firms start reporting holdings data. It is also necessary to restrict myself to holdings that are as close to the commencement of the firm's operations as possible, in keeping with the concern of this paper with decisions taken by founders of start-ups at the beginning of the firms' existence.
"See Ivkovid and Weisbenner (2005) for a similar application. 
IV. Location Determinants

A. Basic Specification and Definition of Variables
I start my analysis of location determinants with the traditional conditional logit framework based on McFadden's (1974) choice model and utilized in the industrial location literature dating back to Carlton (1983) . The basic approach consists of treating the location decision problem as one of random profit maximization. Given a set of mutually exclusive CEAs, the entrepreneur weighs in all the location characteristics of the available spatial choice set and selects the one that will potentially give her the highest profit. Following McFadden (1974) , if I assume the error terms are distributed independently and follow an extreme type value I distribution, I end up with the logistic formulation. In this paper, a firm's founders choose from the CEA in the sample. The dependent variable is therefore denoted 1 for each CEA chosen by a new investment advisory firm in a given year, and 0 otherwise. I discuss the independent variables in detail below.
Among the independent variables, the factors relevant to this analysis are external economies assumed to lead to the clustering of investment management firms. The first set could be interpreted as being relevant to location decisions at three levels: providing markets, being a source of specialized labor, and simply fostering new ideas and innovations that spill over from collocated firms. The markets for an investment management firm are defined by the source of funds under management, the commonly used basis for compensating portfolio managers.
I incorporate the number of establishments in the investment sector (investments and securities SICs) located in each CEA. I take the natural logarithm of the number of establishments plus 1, to avoid disregarding CEAs with no establishments in this industry. I also include similar metrics for the banking and insurance SICs.
For each CEA, I record the natural logarithm of the total assets managed by firms in the Institutional Investor America's Top 300 Money Managers, sampled in the years 1988, 1991, 1996, and 2001 . The market potential arguments for including this variable are similar to the ones for industrial sector establishment data. In short, a fund manager's success as an entrepreneur is often measured in terms of how quickly she secures assets under management. According to my hypotheses regarding locating start-ups close to resources, managers that perceive an advantage in locating close to large institutional investors will give this factor substantial weighting in their location decisions. I also include an indicator of the level of employee costs in different locations denoted by the natural logarithm of the average payroll per employee as described in Section III.
The model contains dummy variables representing Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. These cities have been identified as being dominant fund centers in studies such as Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2004) and Hong et al. (2005) .
County typology factors in the model pick up two effects motivated by my hypotheses. First, from the perspective of an entrepreneurial fund manager, factors such as Low Employment and Low Employment complement indicators of the profit potential of the area. Second, the variables attempt to capture the personal economic and social preferences of fund managers who make the choice to become entrepreneurs. The specification includes the variables Metro, Urban Influence, Financial Center, Housing Stress, Low Education, Low Employment, Low Employment, Recreation, and Retirement as described in Section III. . Econometric Approach. Some econometric concerns arise from the nature of my data. The dependent variable is a binary indicator with several subjects (CEAs) repeated in the event of more than one start-up choosing the same location. A significant portion of the sample also involves CEAs that do not attract start-ups for extended periods. Therefore, in CEA-based tests I augment standard discrete choice models with logistic models that account for the clustered nature of the data by incorporating the Generalized Estimation Equation (GEE) technique. GEE is an extension of generalized linear models applied to longitudinal data (Liang and Zeger (1986) ). GEE corrects for clustering among correlated variables by increasing the correlation among observations within a cluster relative to the correlation between clusters. The results are qualitatively consistent between the basic logistic regression models and their GEE versions. The effect of GEE is to lower the size and significance of the coefficients marginally. However, in no case is there a sign change between logistic and GEE models, reinforcing the rationale for using GEE. Since the procedure yields results that are more conservative than those from models that do not consider the natural autocorrelation of data similar to. those applied in this paper, I only report the GEE estimates.
B. Empirical Results
Basic Specification. The findings of the empirical analysis in this section are presented in Table 4 .1 split the analysis of the basic specification into two models reported in the first and second columns of Table 4 and labeled Models 1 and 2, respectively. The models examine the effects of Investment Establishments and Top Institutional Assets separately. Establishments could offer more information about the availability of expertise in an area while institutional assets could relate more closely to a start-up's prospects of raising funds to manage. The findings regarding location determinants are largely consistent with the hypotheses motivated in Section II.A.
Two results stand out in the basic models. These are the tendency of startups to collocate with incumbent firms and the effects of social and economic area attributes. In Model 1, the coefficients on the establishment variables for the banking and investment industries are positive and statistically significant. As predicted, investment management start-ups are attracted to areas with a significant presence of other firms in the same industry, and are likely to take advantage of local industry networks. They also collocate with bank undertakings. Bank trust departments house well-trained investment professionals with a history of crossing over to the investment industry. There is also weak evidence that Insurance Establishments discourage collocation with investment management start-ups. In Model 2 of Table 4 , the coefficient on the variable measuring institutional assets under management. Top Institutional Assets, is positive and highly statistically significant. This finding suggests start-ups do chase this rich source of funds under management in their location decisions. Regarding employment costs, rather than being deterred start-ups select regions with high payroll costs. This result could be a reflection of a realization by founders that high employment costs are unavoidable when trying to enter this industry.
The second outstanding feature of the results is that, as expected, low education and low employment areas are shunned by start-ups. A surprising result is the neutrality of the Financial Center dummy. One would intuitively expect new investment advisory firms to locate in financial centers, not least to chase assets under management. Finding the opposite result could be related to increasing preferences in services industries for suburban office locations at the expense of financial centers. Although the coefficient on Metro suggests metropolitan areas are favored for start-up locations, the variable has a low level of statistical significance.
The Role of the Home Base. The factors considered in the basic specification could be correlated with a fund manager's consideration of the profitability of an area. However, as argued in Section II.A, there may be information in the influence of where the founders of the new firms originate. While the variables representing social and economic characteristics could account for personal factors that are important to the fund manager, they might not be sufficient to account for the full extent of the influence of her origins. In Models 3 and 4 of Table 4 , following Figueiredo et al. (2002) , I include the variable Home Base to represent the CEA of origin of each firm. Because multiple founders can emanate from different areas, the Home Base dummy equals 1 where more than half the founders of a start-up come from the same locality as that of the firm, and 0 for all others. The fit of my estimates improves significantly as shown by the substantial change in the log-likelihood value. The coefficient estimate of the Home Base dummy variable is sizeable and statistically significant and its positive sign suggests an overwhelming influence of the entrepreneur's origins on where a start-up locates.
Notably, a number of coefficient estimates that were significant in Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 maintain their signs and magnitude. Some are reduced in magnitude, while other variables pick up more significance. After incorporating entrepreneurs' prior locality indicator. Bank Establishments continue to exert a positive infiuence on an area's likelihood of being chosen. Insurance Establishments deter collocation and low employment areas are also avoided. However, apparently absorbed by the Home Base dummy variable, the influence of Investment Establishments and Top Institutional Assets is still positive but much diminished as shown by the loss of statistical significance on the coefficient estimates. Given that the majority of entrepreneurs in my sample do not relocate, this result may be interpreted as indicating that the benefits to an entrepreneur of collocating with incumbent firms and repositories of core assets to be managed are imbedded in the advantages associated with staying in the locality of origin. Similarly, Low Education is likely a factor closely associated with the choice of whether to remain in an area and is thus also reduced in its influence by the Home Base dummy. It is also possible that factors unrelated to the decision to stay in the same location are the ones that stand out separately even in the presence of prior locality considerations. For example, in both Models 3 and 4 of Table 4 , high payroll costs in the insurance industry are now positively related to the probability of a region being chosen while financial centers are a deterrent.
V. Location Choice and Local Bias in Portfolio Preferences
Having analyzed the firm location decisions of entrepreneurial fund managers, I also consider relations between their new firm's location and stock holding preferences. As noted in the Introduction, strong evidence points to a home bias in the portfolio decisions of professional money managers and individual investors. The bias is economically significant in terms of magnitude as well as returns attributed to the practice, suggesting the validity of the argument that investors enjoy an informational advantage when they trade in nearby stocks. In this section, I estimate the extent of home bias in a sample of funds management start-ups and relate the measures to several location characteristics.
A. Home Bias in Start-Ups' Equity Holdings
First, I compare the extent of home bias in the portfolios of entrepreneurial fund managers with Coval and Moskowitz's (2001) findings for mutual funds. I link the location of start-up firms to the location data (county and state) on headquarters of stocks held by the firms obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices/Compustat merged database (CRSP/Compustat). To determine the distance between the fund and each stock held at the end of its first year of reporting, I employ GNIS coordinate information as described in Section III.B. I follow Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and define local bias in the equity holdings of fundy at the end of year r as follows:
where LocaLOwti-Portfolioj^ is the fraction of the market value of a fund's total holdings comprising stocks located within 100 kilometers of the firm and LocalMarketJ'ortfoUOj, is the proportion of all CRSP/Compustat listed stocks (or the market) based within 100 kilometers of the start-up. For comparison.
departing slightly from the Coval and Moskowitz home bias measure, I also compute an alternative metric where local bias is conditioned only on the simple rule of whether the firm holds a particular stock, rather than the value of the full position in that stock.
In Table 5 , I report results of tests of equality between local bias in startups versus the market. On the basis of value of assets held, start-ups bias their holdings 2.5 percentage points in excess of the 6.8% allocation to local stocks that would have prevailed had they invested in the market portfolio. This figure is about three times the 0.8 percentage point bias over and above 6.16% in the market documented for mutual funds by Coval and Moskowitz (2001) . Redefining locally held based on whether a stock is held by a fund, the bias is even stronger at 3.5 percentage points, suggesting that on a stock-by-stock basis start-ups are prone to higher levels of local bias than would be suggested by the value of boldings. These findings conform with the hypothesis that at the start-up stage, fund managers utilize local information in building their portfolios to an extent that translates into a local bias that is significantly higher than that previously reported for mutual fund managers. This phenomenon is observed in spite of the fact tbat the start-ups in this study represent the interests of institutional investors who would be expected to be less locally biased than retail clients in mutual funds. To obtain an indication of the economic significance of tbe local bias shown by start-ups in this paper, consider the performance of locally-based stocks in Coval and Moskowitz (2001) . While Coval and Moskowitz find a "modest" net local bias of 0.8% on average, local stocks held by mutual funds in their sample earn a premium over the risk-free rate of 8.7% per year, 2.67 percentage points above their premium on distant equities. On a risk-adjusted basis, the returns amount to 184 basis points per year.
TABLE 5
Composition ot Start-Ups' Portfolios by Locality Table 5 reports average local and non.local portfolio shares for 152 start.up investment management firms (or 267 founders). For each start-up, portfoiio hoidings are extracted in the last quarter of the first year of statutory reporting of hoidings as recorded in the SDA/Spectrum database in the period 1984 to 2003. Bias.Own.Portfolio denotes the fraction of a start-up's total holdings comprising stocl(s located within 100 kiiometers of the firm and Bias-Market.Por{foiio is the proportion of ali CRSP/Compustat iisted stoci<s (or the mari<et) that are based within 100 kiiometers of the start-up. Hoidings are based on doiiar value of assets or identified on a simpie ruie of whether a stock is heid by the start-up. Locai bias is the differenoe between the start-ups' and market fractions of stooks heid iocally. *" and * indicate non-equality between start-ups' and market portfolios held locaily at the 1% and 10% significance ieveis.
Bias.OwnJ'ortfoiio
BiasMarket-Portfoiio Difference Value of assets residing < 100 kiiometers 9.30% 6.80% 2.50%* Number of stocks residing < 100 kiiometers 9.10% 5.40% 3.70%"*
B. Location Characteristics and Home Bias in Portfolio Holdings
The second objective of this section is to explain home bias in tbe equity preferences of entrepreneurs in relation to the new firms' location preferences. To test the hypotheses motivated in relation to tbe determinants of local bias in start-ups' portfolios, I estimate the regression. Coefficient estimates for the regression are presented in Table 6 . The neutrality of the Home Base dummy variable indicates that start-ups whose founders change locations are not significantly different from non-movers in their propensity to choose local stocks. In fact, in a separate test I find that the difference between the home bias measures for the two groups of firms is not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance.
TABLE 6
Determinants of Net Portfolio Bias to New Location Table 6 Start-ups based in areas with large numbers of investment and insurance companies and significant institutional assets are prone to higher levels of home bias. A one standard deviation increase in the number of investment and insurance establishments in a region hosting a start-up will increase its local bias by 0.07% and 0.25%, respectively. Given these rather modest magnitudes, in terms of economic significance the results are more important in giving directional guidance on the geographic allocation investors may expect to find in start-ups' portfolios based on where the firms locate. The findings suggest that the exploitation of local industry networks by start-ups collocating with related industries increases the tendency to invest in familiar, local assets as proposed by Goetzmann et al. (2004) . However, firms in areas populated with more banking establishments tend to reduce their local bias, suggesting competition from bank investment management operations drives start-ups' security selections further away.
The hypothesis that areas with high employment costs could signal lower levels of local bias finds partial support in the regression results. Only insurance industry labor costs are negatively related to home bias. Start-ups in regions with more payroll costs in the investment and banking industries are prone to significant local bias. Finally, among the factors representing the social and economic characteristics of fund managers' locations, only the Einancial Center variable is significant in explaining home bias. Start-ups that choose financial centers for their locations show lower home bias. This result contradicts Coval and Moskowitz (2001) who find that home bias is higher for managers domiciled in financial centers. However, it is consistent with the expectation that start-ups differentiate themselves by locating their portfolios further away.
Two related themes motivated in my hypotheses regarding the determinants of home bias remain to be examined: i) the number of fund managers, and ii) the presence of stocks in an area. The effects of the concentration of fund managers in an area relative to the stocks available close to the location can be probed further. I define a new variable, Manager-Eirm Density as the intersection of a dummy variable indicating CEAs with an above median number of stocks within a 100-kilometer radius and a dummy variable for CEAs recording below median numbers of investment industry establishments. This new variable is not significant and it does not significantly affect the rest of the coefficient estimates in the model. This finding contradicts the hypothesis that entrepreneurial fund managers locate in areas with few investment companies relative to the number of stocks.
C. The Local Bias Tendencies of Movers
The third set of tests performed in this section concerns the local bias of movers. As motivated in the hypothesis development section, it would be interesting to see how the stock selections of managers that are not constrained to maintaining their home base on becoming entrepreneurs relate to their former bases and their new locations, respectively. Of the 49 managers who relocate upon forming their own firms, 47 have the portfolio holdings data necessary to investigate these issues. For this subset of managers, I calculate Local-Biasj^, as in equation (2) but relative, first to the new base and, second, the former base of the start-up. Simple difference in means tests for the relative samples are reported in Table 7 . Panel A shows that the proportion of stocks held within 100 kilometers of the premises of movers exceeds the value of stocks available in the market generally within this range by 2.20%. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. Movers do appear to hold on to stocks that were formerly local as hypothesized. This finding suggests local bias persists for fund managers who relocate to form new firms.
TABLE 7
Local Bias of Portfolios of Founders That Relocate Table 7 reports three measures of local bias in the portfolios of entrepreneurs who looate away from their origins. For each start-up, portfoiio hoidings are extracted in the last quarter of the first year of statutory reporting of holdings as recorded in the SOA/Spectrum database. The net locai bias, reported in Panel A as BiasJNew.Base and Bias.FormerMase, is the difference between the start-ups' and market fractions of stocks heid iocally (within 100 kiiometers) relative to the location of the start-up (New Base) and the founder's former location (Former Base), respectively. Panel B compares the proportion of an entrepreneur's portfolio located within 100 kilometers of her former base against the proportion of the market portfolio iocated in that range, Panei C compares the proportion of an entrepreneur's portfoiio iocated within 100 kilometers of her new base against the proportion of the market portfoiio iocated in that range, Bias.OwnJPortfolio denotes the fraction of a start-up's total hoidings comprising stocks iocated within 100 kilometers of the location of interest and Bias-Market-Portlolio is the proportion of ali CRSP/Compustat listed stocks (or the market) that are based within 100 kiiometers of the location, " and ' denote statisticai significance at the 5% and 10% ieveis, respectively Panel A. Net Local Bias to Former CEA Compared to New CEA Vaiue of assets residing < 100 kilometers Number of stocks residing < 100 kilometers
Panei B. Tendency to Invest Close to Former Base
Value of assets residing, < 100 kiiometers Number of stocks residing < 100 kilometers
Panel C. Tendency to Invest Close to New Base
Value of assets residing < 100 kilometers Number of stocks residing < 100 kilometers In Panels B and C of Table 7 ,1 further investigate the sources of differences in local bias between movers' former and current home bases. In Panel B, I report the tendency of movers to invest close to their new base without relating the measure to the market portfolio as in Panel A. Likewise Panel C only considers a raw measure of the tendency of movers to choose local stocks. The results suggest that the main driver of the difference between the net bias of movers to their former and current bases is their tendency to retain stocks that are were formerly local. Differences between the movers' own portfolios held locally and the stocks available in that range are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, depending on whether value or number of stocks is considered. Relative to the new base, the difference in managers' own portfolios and the market portfolio available locally are not statistically significant. However, the sign on net local bias is positive suggesting that even movers begin to tilt their portfolio selections toward their new base in the early part of their firms' existence.
In summary, the findings presented in this section show that the effects of geography on fund managers' portfolios are persistent. Managers who relocate with their start-ups exhibit remnants of bias toward their prior home base while showing signs of a growing preference for stocks close to new locations. The beginnings of home bias at the start-up stage of the life cycle of investment companies studied in this paper are likely to persist as they mature.
VI. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
This paper is the first attempt to examine the location decisions of start-ups in the investment management industry. While a significant literature addresses the consequences of location-based factors on outcomes such as the investment performance of portfolio managers, the origins of the location choices are not fully understood. I find significant complementarities between new firm location decisions and the presence of investment companies, banking operations, and large institutional money managers. High payroll costs are not a deterrent to location, but factors inimical to managers' personal social and economic affluence such as poor education and employment prospects drive away start-ups. I find that a clear home bias exists in the location decisions of entrepreneurial fund managers. Over 75% of entrepreneurial fund managers locate within 25 kilometers of their former employers' regions. These statistics suggest that most entrepreneurial fund managers are constrained to their original location by such considerations as the need to perpetuate professional, social, and family networks, and relocation costs. Controlling specifically for start-ups whose founders mostly originate from the same area as the new firm, I confirm that the area of origin indeed heavily conditions where founders locate.
The second objective of this paper is to investigate the tendencies of start-ups to bias their portfolio selections toward nearby stocks. This paper's novel contribution in this regard is to examine the portfolio decisions of fund managers for evidence of the influence of location attributes on stock selection tendencies. I find that the local bias of start-ups' equity investments is three-fold the Coval and Moskowitz (2001) measure for mutual funds. The results on the determinants of local bias suggest a strong correlation between the propensity to invest closer to the home base and the presence of sub-advisory opportunities from institutional investors in an area. In a final step, as a further robustness check on the role of geography in the genesis of home bias, I consider the portfolio holdings of managers who relocate when they become entrepreneurs. Consistent with the view that the value of local networks persists, I show that movers retain a significant bias toward stocks that were formerly local. However, nascent signs of local bias toward their new bases are also present.
The analysis presented in this paper could be extended in a number of directions. First, the study offers a static view of the strategic actions of entrepreneurial fund managers at the commencement of their new firms. The portfolio strategies followed by the new firms beyond the inception stage are a fruitful area for future research. Second, most founders appear to be constrained to their original bases, implying that entrepreneurship in this industry increases local competition for incumbent firms. I plan to study the reaction of investment companies whose fund managers depart to form their own firms. More generally, the existence of entrepreneurs in the investment industry presents an attractive setting in which to carry out a detailed examination of the nature of individuals who take the selfemployment career route.
